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ABSTRACT
THE WELFARE STATES: EXAMINING U.S. STATE-LEVEL BENEFITS FOR
FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN, 1987-2015
SEPTEMBER 2020
ANTHONY HUAQUI, B.A., CENTRAL CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jasmine Kerrissey
Welfare state scholars have amassed competing theoretical explanations for the
development of welfare policies. When considering the U.S. case, a discussion of
federalism is central to these theoretical examinations. How power in policymaking is
distributed amongst the varying levels of government is influential in the construction of
the U.S. welfare state. Standard quantitative approaches to U.S. welfare research have
offered a limited analysis of how theoretical explanations change after historical
moments of welfare reform. In this study, I examine the institutional changes introduced
to U.S. welfare in 1996 by way of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). This study examines the changes in welfare maximum
benefit levels for a 3-person family from 1987-2015. However, I apply an alternative
quantitative approach to studying the effects PRWORA has had on benefit maximums by
splitting models into two separate time periods and running analyses separately: prePRWORA (1987-1996) and post-PRWORA (1997-2015). By applying this
methodological approach, I demonstrate how the influence of different sets of theories
change after institutional reforms, such as PRWORA. The results offer new insights to
the temporal applicability of different theoretical explanations and the construction of
social citizenship.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The welfare state’s purpose is to reduce inequality and grant social rights to
citizens by the redistribution of resources and income through government-controlled
programs and services (Garfinkel, Rainwater and Smeeding 2010; Marshall 1950). How
welfare programs become constructed and administered has implications for who within
a polity is granted the title of full citizenship and granted economic security (Mettler
1998; Goldberg 2007). Understanding the expansion and retrenchment of the welfare
state has thus been a central question for political sociologists. This paper introduces a
different methodological approach, which splits time periods based on federalist
institutional changes to policymaking. Doing so provides new insights into welfare state
change and how its determinants change over time, particularly for programs aimed at
families with children.
Three major camps of welfare theories explored in this paper are political,
economic, and racial (Brown and Best 2017). Some scholars argue that political
explanations, be it institutions or actors, are the primary driving force for determining
welfare generosity (Korpi 1983; Orloff 1993; Esping-Andersen 1990; Skocpol 1985).
Another group of scholars argue that it is primarily economic resources that best explain
welfare generosity (Wilensky 1975; Cutright 1965). A third group have argued that
welfare generosity is driven by racial contexts, particularly within the U.S. (Quadagno
1994; Alesina and Glaeser 2004). These theories have been examined by both crossnational and state-level studies.
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The U.S. has a the ‘dual federalist’ political structure (Mettler 1998). This system
preserves state and local autonomy alongside a centralized national government (Mettler
1998). Federalism has been embedded into the U.S. political system since its inception
and its institutional changes have given different levels of government varying degrees of
power throughout U.S. history. Welfare policymaking is a key area in which federalism
has taken root, and a major area of social science inquiry (Finegold 2005; Freeman and
Rogers 2007; Skocpol and Ikenberry 1983; Skocpol and Amenta 1986; Weil and Skocpol
1983; Thompson 2008).
The responsibility and funding of welfare policies on individual state and local
governments has increased since 1996, a.k.a. the “devolution” of welfare policymaking.
Welfare scholars identify the 1996 welfare reform that implemented the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) as an important
moment in the devolution process. Increasing states’ responsibility of welfare spending
for families with children has led states to privatize and retrench welfare programs that
administered public assistance for families in order to minimize the financial burden
brought on by PRWORA. Specifically, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program, replaced by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) under
PRWORA, were targets of PRWORA.
PRWORA shifted decisions on welfare generosity from the national level to
primarily the state and local levels. This transfer in political arenas to subnational
governments has implications for which set of theories apply pre- and postimplementation of PRWORA and how this influences the social citizenship of women
and children. Methodologically, this suggests analyzing these two distinct time periods
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separately, instead of analyzing a single time period that includes years before and after
this act’s implementation. Yet previous work has not taken this methodological approach,
leaving questions on the temporal impacts of institutional change on citizenship underexamined.
The 1996 welfare reform introduced a fundamental institutional shift in welfare
policymaking. As a result, the factors that explain benefit levels may differ across these
periods. As federalism spreads post-1996, how state political actors and race determine
AFDC/TANF maximum benefits changes in response to this institutional restructuring.
This study uses yearly state level data from 1987 and 2015 to assess how the three sets of
theories explored (political, economic and racial) in quantitative analyses influence
benefit levels before and after PRWORA. Quantitative studies focused on AFDC/TANF
often use a year dummy for 1996 to account for this act (Kelly 2005; Brady et al. 2013).
Yet methodologically, it is possible to gain a more constructive understanding of which
of these welfare theories explain spending for families within states by analyzing the pre1996 time period and 1996-onwards separately.

3

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Federalism and the U.S. Welfare State
The federalist governance structure of the U.S. shapes how institutions and actors
navigate political spaces (Lieberman 1998). Changes to institutional arrangements, such
as those caused by policy implementation, influence the power that different levels of
government possess. For example, the Social Security Act of 1935 enlarged the powers
of the federal government by establishing national welfare programs, including Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC) (Mettler 1998). More recently, individual U.S. states have
gained greater levels of autonomy in social and economic policy determination with the
passing of PRWORA (Brady et al. 2013; Moller 2008; Soule and Zylan 1997). These
historical shifts in welfare responsibility have resulted in a stratified system of welfare
provisions.
The federalist political structure of the U.S. has been influential in constructing a
stratified welfare system. Justification for welfare claims are made as one of three types:
needs, earnings, and rights (Gordon 1994). Welfare claims along these three fronts hold
unequal legitimacy as claims based on rights are seen as the most legitimate and claims
based on needs seen as the least legitimate. This logic on claims has implications for how
welfare programs are stratified: welfare programs that are rights- and earnings-based
receive greater payments and reputations; welfare programs that provide less generous
support are needs-based (Gordon 1994). Old-age insurance (Social Security) is an
example of a program in the “better” welfare strata due to it being based on earnings in
the labor market; AFDC/TANF are examples of programs in the “worse” welfare strata
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since this assistance is not determined by one’s labor market involvement but on
households’ (usually single mother households) material needs. Federal programs tend to
be right-based and more generous, while state-level programs are more likely to be needbased and less generous. This separation and stratification of the U.S. welfare state
impacts the construction of American citizenship.
Structural arrangements for policy formation influence the character and
experience of citizenship of those covered by the policy. Under federalism, American
citizenship is divided by the coexistence of two forms of governance (federal and
state/local) that has become separated in terms of gender (Mettler 1998). The welfare
programs that were designed to be controlled by the federal government were granted to
those who have positions within the labor market that were not in the agricultural or
domestic market, predominantly white men. Programs such as Aid to Dependent
Children (later AFDC and then TANF) were labeled as “welfare” instead of
“entitlements” and administered by state and local governments (Mink 1995). These
public assistance programs were designed to keep white women out of the labor force,
reinforce traditional family structures, and promote a middle-class, white “Maternalist”
idea of motherhood (Gordon 1994; Mink 1995; Morgan 2006). Additionally, domestic
and agricultural workers were ineligible for public assistance programs under the Social
Security Act of 1935. As these jobs were largely occupied by people of color, this
demonstrates the embedded racism of welfare politics (Gordan 1994; Mink 1995). Men
were granted national (and thus full) citizenship while women and people of color were
rejected from accessing full citizenship.
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While the efforts of social movements and changes to the U.S. economy have
challenged the consequences of this dual citizenship model, efforts to restrict women and
people of color from being fully incorporated citizens by access to public policy benefits
have continued. Of particular importance is the welfare reform of 1996 through the
passing of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA). This act continued what is referred to as the “devolution” of welfare
policymaking by granting state and local governments increased autonomy in overseeing
the administration and formation of welfare programs for families with children.
The “Devolution” of Welfare Policymaking through PRWORA
The Era of Rediscovered Federalism (aka “New Federalism”) is characterized by
the “devolution” of welfare policymaking, where the responsibility of welfare
policymaking by state and local governments has increased (Winston 2002; Zylan and
Soule 2000). The Reagan administration’s 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) was the first of these efforts and emphasized work requirements,
decentralization and greater restrictions for welfare assistance programs. However,
decentralization took priority in 1996 with PRWORA. Signed into law under the Clinton
administration, PRWORA radically changed welfare politics in the U.S.
The Clinton administration’s welfare reform gained support from New Democrats
and Republicans alike who sought to fundamentally restructure the U.S. welfare state to
gain support from working-class, white male voters (Reese 2005). This act ended AFDC
and implemented TANF, which had stricter work requirements and limitations for cash
assistance (Thompson and Gais 2000). PRWORA also gave states the ability to apply for
a welfare waiver which would grant individual states the power to be “innovative” with
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TANF in terms of eligibility requirements, funding allocated, and the ability to “contract
out” administrative services to private agencies (Winston 2002; Moller 2008). States that
submitted welfare waivers to experiment with welfare policymaking and eligibility led
other states within its geographic proximity to also submit waivers (Zylan and Soule
2000). This “devolution” of welfare policymaking not only increased the responsibility of
policymaking to the state and local-level but also shifted the political arena in which
interest groups competed for these policies.
Women and people of color were most impacted by the 1996 reform. Marriage
promotion and work enforcement for women and people of color were part of PRWORA
(Abramovitz 2006; Reese 2005). There was an insistence on cutting welfare for teen and
unwed mothers, who were racialized as being predominantly young women of color.
States were given the power to regulate women’s productive lives through “family caps”
on benefits, which denied additional TANF support for mothers who had children while
on welfare. There were also incentives for recipients of TANF to use Norplant (a birth
control drug) and for teen mothers to live with their parents (Reese 2005). Federal
welfare offices even authorized an annual monetary reward to the ten states with the
highest percentage increase of children residing in a married, two-parent household.
Congress introduced a five-year lifetime limit on the receipt of benefits for
welfare recipients that forced them to take any job possible after the 5 years were over,
regardless of wages or working conditions. Many states adopted policies with lifetime
limits fewer than five years. This created a low-wage workforce that was comprised of
predominantly women of color (Simmons 2002). Welfare-to-work programs created by
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states under PRWORA pushed women of color into public-sector positions but for lower
pay than formally employed public-sector workers and without the ability to unionize.
Federal assistance for the funding of TANF was no longer an entitlement but was
converted into a state-administered block grant. This capped federal assistance for the
program, leaving a new responsibility for funding the welfare program to individual state
budgets (Abramovitz 2006). After PRWORA passed, states accounted for one-quarter of
total public spending on welfare programs (Howard 1999; Hayes and Vidal 2015). States
were at risk of losing federal funding if the newly instilled work requirements were not
met. This created a sense of interstate competition that reduced welfare generosity,
particularly for the TANF program (Bailey and Rom 2004). With the shift in funding
responsibility for TANF to individual states, privatization and retrenchment increasingly
became mechanisms by which state and local governments could minimize welfare
expenditures.
Block-grant federal funding for TANF, declining tax bases and increased
demands for state services pushed state and local governments to look for alternatives
(Reese 2011). Referred to as third-sector organizations, public-private relationships
emerged as a way to administer welfare services between government control and the
free market. Managerialist and quasi-market principles embedded in these private social
service contracts countered the need for flexible, individualized services or involve
clients in decision-making. This impacted public-sector unionized workers who
administered benefits for TANF. These workers came under attack as privatization efforts
by politicians and business interests claimed that these workers were inefficient and overpaid.
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The administration of public assistance for families with children became
increasingly decentralized, with subnational governments adopting more responsibility
for eligibility determination and funding. While there is general consensus on the
importance of PRWORA, there are still debates surrounding what factors predominantly
explain benefit levels for families. Three sets of welfare state theories might explain these
factors as primarily based on politics, economic resources, and racism. Drawing from
these larger theoretical perspectives informs what we expect to see as primary
determinants of benefits for AFDC/TANF before and after the institutional changes under
PRWORA are in effect.
Welfare State Theories and Expected Findings
There is a lot of variation in welfare spending across U.S. states, including the
amount of benefits allocated to families with children through TANF. In 2015,
Mississippi had the lowest TANF maximum monthly benefit at $170.00 while Alaska
had the highest TANF maximum monthly benefit at $923.00.
Welfare state scholars have produced an expansive literature examining what
factors influence the implementation of policies and welfare generosity. Three theories
that are a focus in this study as explanations for these differences in welfare state
expansion include: political, economic and racial (Brown and Best 2017). The following
sections explain these theories, as well as how their influence may change under
primarily federal decision making (pre PRWORA) versus state level (post PRWORA).
Political Theories
Institutional Approach
A large literature analyzes how political institutions shape welfare spending.
Skocpol (1985) considers how states themselves affect political and social processes
9

through policies and relationships with social groups. Long-term political transformations
that are the legacies of state formation shape welfare policies as well (Orloff 1993;
Pierson 1994). Institutional arrangements and features at the state-level can affect how
legislators and other policy makers craft welfare policies during the policymaking
process (Amenta and Halfmann 2000; Amenta et al. 2005; Pierson 1996; Kwon and
Pontusson 2010). These scholars argue that there is a certain level of path dependency,
based on the way institutional structures have been set up in the past. Successful reform
of the welfare state can be influenced by the ability of would-be reformers navigating a
hostile policy environment that is temporally affected by states’ history of welfare
generosity (Pierson 1996; Heclo 1976).
This institutional approach establishes one important way to think about welfare
reform. As discussed earlier, the passing of PRWORA caused an institutional change in
how responsibility and funding for AFDC/TANF was distributed along differing levels of
governance. Understanding this fundamental goal of PRWORA theoretically drives this
study’s analysis. These shifting institutional arrangements of welfare benefits for families
with children has an effect on how influential predictors of benefit levels change pre- and
post- reform. Running analyses separately between pre- and post-PRWORA time periods
provide insights on how changes to political institutional arrangements impacts the
temporal applicability of political, economic, and racial theoretical explanations for
programs aimed at families with children.
Class-based Actors Approach
Other welfare state scholars focus on the role of political actors. Power resource
theory argues that Leftist political actors influence social policy and the expansion of the
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welfare state (Korpi 1983, 1985, 1989; Brady 2009). Within this category are two
primary actors: Leftist political parties and labor unions. Leftist political parties compete
within the political arena for electoral power and have advocated for more generous
welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001; Brady 2009; Kwon and
Pontusson 2010; Primo and Snyder 2010). Labor unions represent the interests of
workers and have also been correlated with higher welfare spending (Marlow and
Orzechowski 1996; Simmons 2002). Unions have supported Leftist political parties due
to their more egalitarian ideologies and vocal support for labor rights. In the U.S., this has
primarily come in the form of labor movement support for the Democratic party,
although it is important to note that this party is politically more centrist than traditional
Leftist political parties (Dark 2001; Rosenfeld 2014).
The interests of capital as a political actor can be advanced through the welfare
state. Efforts to reduce funding to public services, weaken the bargaining power of labor,
and strengthen the political power of right-wing organizations have recently become the
target of studies at the state-level (Lafer 2012, 2017; Reese 2005; Witko and Newmark
2005). Right-wing organizations, such as the American Legislative Exchange Council
(ALEC), lobby on behalf of capital interests to retrench welfare programs.
These explanations of welfare state development influence what we would expect
to see both pre- and post-PRWORA, as this shift in policymaking takes place. Prior to
PRWORA, with AFDC, states still had some discretion with how they could administer
the program, leading to variation of program benefits across states. However, political
actors focused lobbying for policies within the federal political arena and less at the state
level.

11

The importance of political actors, specifically unions and partisan actors,
changes with PRWORA. We would expect to see political actors as a significant factor of
AFDC/TANF maximum benefits in both periods but to a lesser degree prior to 1996 since
political actors are more focused on exercising their resources at the federal level then. It
is once responsibility for TANF benefit levels become increasingly focused in state and
local-governments that we expect to see class-based actors, particularly state-level
Democratic political control and labor unions, become increasingly significant.
Economic Theories
Scholars have also explored economic explanations, where policies and welfare
programs are dependent on economic factors. Increased funding to welfare programs is
used to halt social unrest caused by high unemployment while low unemployment can
compel states to spur welfare cutbacks to keep labor in low-wage positions (Piven and
Cloward 1971).
Within these economic explanations, scholars have argued that economic
conditions are a result of the neoliberal project, characterized by an emphasis on free
market principles and the reduction of government intervention in the market. The
neoliberal agenda has led policymakers to alter eligibility requirements for welfare
programs (Abramovitz 2014; Soss et al. 2011). Fiscal crises can influence a state to cut
back on welfare spending and choose to privatize social services to private contractors in
order to minimize expenditures (O’Connor 1973; Offe 1984). Fundamental shifts in local
labor markets can render welfare programs less effective, increasing the need for social
welfare spending (Bertram 2013). Across U.S. states, state per capita income is correlated
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with the amount of benefits received from welfare programs (Zimmermann and Tumlin
1999).
I would expect economic factors to be significant prior to 1996. Increases in
unemployment and poverty rates within states would garner a response of increased
AFDC generosity. As a goal of AFDC was to bring white children and their mothers out
of poverty in order to keep them out of the labor market and provide aid to ‘future
citizens’ of the polity, states would likely increase benefits to adhere to these populations
(Gordon 1994; Mink 1995; Morgan 2006). We would expect the economic growth of a
state to negatively influence AFDC benefits, since improved economic conditions have
resulted in reduced AFDC caseloads prior to PRWORA (Reese 2005).
By contrast, economic factors are not expected to play as critical an influence
post-1996. States implemented more stringent work requirements and shorter benefit
periods on TANF after PRWORA was passed. TANF benefits now required employment,
forcing the poor into low-wage or temp jobs established by welfare-to-work programs.
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) also subsidized the low-wage labor force which
ensured its continued reproduction. As states became increasingly focused on reducing
TANF caseloads by forcing the emergence of a low-wage labor force, it is expected that
unemployment and poverty rates will not be as significant a factor in determining
AFDC/TANF maximum benefits.
Racial Theories
A third group of welfare state theories that I focus on in this paper argues for
racial explanations for the construction of welfare policies, particularly within the U.S.
context. This work focuses on the role that racial tensions, divisions, and discrimination
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have had on welfare policy implementation (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Brown 2013; Fox
2012; Neubeck and Casenave 2001). Racial discrimination of African Americans in
workplaces has restricted their accessibility to public and private benefits (Brown 1999;
Gordon 1994; Lieberman 1998; Mink 1998). The public opinions of whites towards
racial minorities and welfare spending have influenced policymakers’ decisions
surrounding the extent of funding for welfare programs (Gilens 1999; Johnson 2001,
2003). Taken one step further, whites have historically halted welfare initiatives that
threatened the racial hierarchy within U.S. (Quadagno 1994). In the U.S., restructuring
the welfare system through race-neutral social policies is a way to control the behaviors
of women of color, who were demonized as being abusers of welfare generosity
(Abramovitz 1992, 2006; Misra et al. 2003). The percentage of blacks at the state- or
local-level has been a determinant of both welfare generosity and how strict eligibility for
welfare benefits were (Moller 2002; Reese 2005; Soss et al., 2011).
Racism has strongly influenced welfare politics surrounding benefits for families
with children. Reagan-era politics stigmatized people of color, primarily women of color,
as abusing the welfare system, referring to them as ‘welfare queens’ (Hancock 2004;
Misra et al. 2003). The rhetoric and eligibility reform behind PRWORA were also
racialized, disproportionately and negatively affecting people of color (Abramovitz 2000;
Mink 1998; Reese 2005). Therefore, we expect to see the percentage of a state’s
population that is nonwhite as a significant, negative influencer to AFDC/TANF
maximum benefits both prior and post 1996.
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Political institutions/actors, economic factors, and racial discrimination are the
three theoretical foci of this paper, although there are other theoretical perspectives
within the broader welfare literature12.
This study uses a methodological approach to account for the effects of
PRWORA that is similar to Kelly and Witko (2012). Examining inequality in the U.S.,
the authors view the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 as a pivotal moment for
devolution and so split their analyses to pre and post-1995 time periods. This
methodological approach allowed them to test how federal and state governments
influence inequality in these two distinct time periods. Similarly, I identify the passing of
PRWORA as a crucial moment of federalism and so split my analyses into pre and post1996 time periods. Doing so allows me to test how different factors influence benefit
levels for families with children before and after changes to institutional arrangements
granted state and local-level governments increased responsibility.

1

(See Quadagno 1987).
Feminist theories of the welfare state are a perspective that highlights the intersectional inequalities of
welfare policymaking. However, feminist theories are not directly assessed in this paper for reasons of
length.
2
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CHAPTER 3
DATA
Data is drawn from the Michigan State University’s Institute for Public Policy and
Social Research’s (IPPSR) Correlates of State Policy and the University of Kentucky’s
Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR) National Welfare datasets. These datasets
combined contain hundreds of state variables from a multitude of sources for all 50
states, with the unit of analysis being state-year. The IPPSR dataset contains data from
1900-2016 and the UKCPR dataset contains data from 1980-2017. Different variables
used contained data for different years. Any variables that did not contain data for all the
years used in these analyses were imputed by the author.
The main dependent variable is AFDC/TANF maximum monthly benefits for a 3person family in a given year (Brady and Burroway 2012; Brady et al. 2013). This
measure captures the maximum monthly cash benefit given under AFDC or TANF,
depending on pre- or post-PRWORA, per year that was allowed for a 3-person family3.
Analyses were also run for 2-person and 4-person families with similar results. The
amounts were converted into 2015 dollars. The AFDC and TANF programs were the
programs most directly affected by the welfare reforms under PRWORA, leading to
privatization, retrenchment of benefits, and deepening the gendered divide of citizenship.
By focusing on the maximum benefits allowed for 3-person families by individual states,
this approach captures which factors impacted the determination of state spending on
families at different eras.

3

It should be noted that while this measure offers maximum monthly benefits, families rarely received
this maximum. This does pose a limitation for this particular measure. Average per family data for
AFDC/TANF spending by states is unavailable. This makes the following analysis a conservative test.
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The first set of explanatory variables tests political theories of welfare generosity.
Korpi’s power resource theory (1983) indicates that class-based political actors influence
social policy: Leftist political parties and labor unions expand welfare generosity, while
capital aims to retrench welfare generosity within the political arena. Public-sector union
density and Private-sector union density capture how influential organized labor has been
on maximum benefits for 3-person families in these two eras. This is measured as the
proportion of nonagricultural workers in the public- and private-sector who are
represented by a union, respectively (Hirsch and MacPherson 2003). Labor unions have
historically advocated for the interests of those of lower socioeconomic status and pushed
for greater redistributive programs (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Western and Rosenfeld
2011; Brady et al. 2013). This has been evident in programs that benefit working-class
families such as AFDC/TANF, especially as post-PRWORA privatization and
retrenchment efforts are “justified” by a discourse of over-paid and inefficient publicsector unionized workers (Simmons 2002; Hebdon 2006; Marlow and Orzechowski
1995, 1996; Hirsch and Osborne 2000).
Following the political theories of welfare state expansion, the role of political
parties is also included as explanatory variables. A dummy variable is utilized to test the
impact of Democrat versus Republican controlled state-governments on AFDC/TANF
generosity. Democratic party control (Democrat = 1) as a measure tests the effects of
political parties. For this dummy variable, mixed governance and Republican controlled
state-governments are the reference category. Political party control of a state
government is measured as a political party having control of the legislature and being
the affiliated part of the state’s governor. A dummy variable is also included for State
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Democratic Governor (Democrat = 1) to test whether this political position gains
increased power and importance once TANF responsibility gets shifted to state and locallevel political arenas. With the ability to veto proposed bills at the state level, having a
separate measure for the Governor position assesses whether this political actor becomes
increasingly influential post PRWORA. Robustness checks and additional analyses
showed that the removal of either of these political party variables do not change overall
results. Analyses available upon request.
Recent studies examine the role of capital’s ability to mobilize at the state-level
(Lafer 2012, 2017; Reese 2005). This power often gets mobilized through right-wing
organizations that lobby for welfare retrenchment at the state-level, such as ALEC (Lafer
2012). This is a further examination of the applicability of Korpi’s power resource theory
(1983) and how capital aims to retrench welfare generosity. Increased interest in this has
led to the inclusion of share of total income earned by the top 1% of earners as an
explanatory variable. This variable serves as a proxy for the amount of power that capital
has at the state-level.
The second set of explanatory variables tests the effect of economic explanations
for welfare determination. Welfare and social policy scholars identify multiple economic
factors that affect welfare spending. One argument has been the economic growth of
states and fiscal crises/downturns can affect the generosity of the state’s welfare
programs. For this reason, gross state product (GSP) per capita in a given year is
included in this study as an explanatory variable. This is the amount of gross domestic
product (GDP) of the U.S. that has been produced by individual states in 2015 real
dollars. Other state level economic variables include unemployment rate and poverty rate.
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The former is the percent of a state’s noninstitutionalized labor force that is not
employed. The latter is the percent of the state’s population that is living in poverty.
Official poverty rates include monetary incomes before taxes, capital gains, and noncash
benefits. These measures test economic theories which argue that welfare generosity is
determined by the market positions of the populace. The final economic variable included
in this study is median household income. This is the median of all household incomes in
a state in real 2015 dollars and will test how state median incomes impact benefit levels
in both periods.
The third set of theories of welfare state expansion in this study are race-based
theories. Race-based welfare theories argue that racial attitudes and discrimination
determine welfare spending and eligibility. To test this set of welfare theories, the
variable nonwhite is included as an explanatory variable. This variable is measured as the
percent of the state population that is identified as nonwhite4.

4

It should be noted that using this measure provides its own set of limitations, as it was predominantly
Black/African American and Latinx communities who were the primary focus of racialized welfare
discourse. However, data for %Black/African American and %Latinx measures at individual state-levels are
not readily available for the entire years included in this study.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
This research analyzes AFDC/TANF maximum monthly benefits for families
from 1987 to 2015. To account for different mechanisms before and after PRWORA, the
analyses examine the time periods separately, 1987-1996 and 1997-2015. Doing so
allows for each time period to be treated independently and best capture which set of
factors were most significant for AFDC/TANF generosity, pre- and post-PRWORA.
Previous studies have attempted to capture this temporal change by including a year
dummy for 1996 or have not considered structural changes in policymaking as a variable
into their analyses (Brady et al. 2013). All variables were lagged by three years since
welfare spending is determined by previous year contexts, consistent with what other
state-level studies have indicated [Jensen et al. 2006; Amenta et al. 2005; Grogan and
Rigby 2009]5. The three-year lag produced the strongest results. This also ensures that the
dependent variable follows the independent variables. The samples for all 50 state-years
for 1987-1996 is (N = 500) and for 1997-2015 is (N = 950).
To capture the variation in AFDC/TANF benefits within states over time, twoway fixed-effects models are utilized. The usage of two-way fixed-effects models has
been used in other studies examining within-state variation over time (Primo and Snyder
Jr 2010; Hayes and Vidal 2015; Kelly and Witko 2012; Brady et al. 2013). The benefit of
using these models is that it allows for an appropriate capture of temporal variation
within states. However, running separate two-way fixed-effects models based on the
passing of PRWORA demonstrate that different factors have significant effects on state

5

Tests for other lagged structures were done (up to three years) with other results supporting the results
of three-year lag structures.
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maximum monthly benefits across the two eras indicated. This is the methodological
benefit to taking this approach.
With two-way fixed-effects models, there is the possibility of stable unobserved
characteristics causing omitted variable bias. In the case of states, this may include being
in the South, right-to-work laws, cost of living differences, etc. The data is thus clustered
by state and year, with year dummies, to account for any stable characteristics and
accurately estimate the effect of state variables on AFDC and TANF maximum monthly
benefits.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
AFDC and TANF maximum monthly benefits have changed over time. All states
showed a decrease in AFDC/TANF maximum monthly benefits between its 1987 amount
and 2015 amount, in 2015 dollars. Figure 1 captures the average state AFDC/TANF
maximum monthly benefits for a 3-person family in both time periods for all 50 states:
1987 to 1996 and 1997 to 2015. The blue line represents the average AFDC maximum
monthly benefit of the respective state between 1987 and 1996. The orange line
represents the average TANF maximum monthly benefit of the respective state between
1997 and 2015. The states are arranged in descending order for their average spending in
the latter period.
TANF (previously AFDC) maximum monthly benefits decreased in the post-1996
period for all states. Increased responsibility for states to fund public assistance programs
and limitations by federal block grants led to decreases in the amount state governments
allocated to welfare spending for families with children. This combined with the rhetoric
to retrench the welfare state, particularly by decreasing dependence of women of color.
However, there is variation amongst states in how much they allotted as monthly
maximums for families with children.
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Towards the top of Figure 1, states such as New York, Alaska, Vermont, and
California have some of the highest TANF maximum benefits in the later period. New
York, for example, had an average of $804.26 in maximum monthly TANF benefits for a
3-person family between 1997 and 2015. Even in the earlier period, New York still
administered one of the most generous amounts of benefits for families, having an
average maximum of $994.12. Looking at other states, California had an average of
$817.70 and Alaska an average of $1,111.08 on TANF maximum benefits in the later
period.
Towards the bottom of Figure 1, states such as Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi
and Tennessee have some of the lowest TANF maximum monthly benefits in the later
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period. For example, Mississippi had an average monthly maximum of $193.16 in TANF
benefits for a 3-person family between 1997 and 2015 and an average monthly maximum
of $214.75 between 1987 and 1996, making it the lowest-spending state in both time
periods. Arkansas had a monthly maximum average of $245.54 in TANF benefits during
the later period while Alabama had a monthly maximum average of $236.27 in the same
period for 3-person families.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
1984-1996
1997-2015
Mean
SD
Minimum Maximum
Mean
SD
Minimum
AFDC/TANF Maximum Monthly Benefits* $686.01
$271.10 $181.27 $1,600.32 $505.16
$199.01 $170.00
Political Variables
Public-Sector Union Density
33.61
16.64
7.3
73.1
33.13
17.75
2.7
Private-Sector Union Density
10.78
4.94
2.3
23.6
7.13
3.74
1.1
Democratic Governor
0.54
0.5
0
1
0.44
0.5
0
Democratic State Gov. Control
0.27
0.45
0
1
0.21
0.41
0
Inc. Share earned by Top 1%
12.97
2.57
7.61
23.29
17.52
4.52
10.12
Economic Variables
GSP per capita
$25,602.51 $5,723.88 $15,233 $56,026 $45,125.51 $8,724.52 $28,265
Unemployment Rate
5.97
1.76
2.2
13.1
5.65
1.98
2.2
Poverty Rate
13.34
4.17
2.9
27.2
12.54
3.35
4.5
Median Household Income
$51,885.23 $8,595.45 $33,481 $80,458 $56,348.17 $8,679.77 $36,011
Racial Variable
Percent Nonwhite
19.2
13.49
1.61
70.52
23.82
14.28
1.84
* For 3-person families

Before turning to the multivariate analysis, descriptive statistics report how
AFDC and TANF monthly maximum benefits have changed over time. Table 1 shows
the descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in the following analysis. All of
the explanatory variables are lagged by three years. Breaking down the two distinct time
periods, we see a difference in how much states have allocated to benefits for families
after transforming benefits into 2015 dollars. The mean AFDC maximum monthly
benefits for a 3-person family of all states prior to the welfare reform of 1996 is $686.01;
after PRWORA, and the change to TANF, it was $505.16. Federal funding was reduced
to block-grants instead of entitlements, meaning that funding from the federal
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Maximum
$1,362.99
72.4
19.4
1
1
36.07
$73,505
14.4
23.1
$81,018
76.81

government for families were a set amount. With states required to cover the remaining
welfare funds, states had economic incentives to see decreases in welfare benefits for
families in the latter time period as subnational governments sought to decrease their
financial share of responsibility.
I argue in this paper that it is more beneficial methodologically to split this time
period into two distinct eras: pre PRWORA (1987 to 1996) and post PRWORA (1997 to
2015). States gained greater power and control over welfare policymaking once the act
was put into place. Theoretically, different welfare theories apply to these two distinct
eras as the political arenas in which welfare benefits and generosity levels were changed.
Prior to PRWORA, determination of welfare benefits for AFDC were still primarily
generated at the federal or national-level. Once PRWORA was enacted, and AFDC was
replaced by TANF, state and local-governments gained increased autonomy. Examining
these two eras separately tests for this theoretical argument.
Model 1 of Table 2 presents the pre PRWORA period. Here we see that it is a
mixture of political, economic and racial explanations that account for the change in
welfare maximums for families with children within states over time. For political
variables, both private-sector union density and unified Democratic control of state
government are correlated with AFDC benefits. A 1% increase in private-sector union
density within a state is associated with an increase of $7.83 in AFDC monthly maximum
benefits over a three-year period (p < 0.01). Unified Democratic control of state
governance in associated with an increase in $12.09 in AFDC monthly maximum
benefits over a three-year period (p < 0.05).
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Table 2. Predicting AFDC/TANF Maximum Monthly Benefits.
Model 1
Model 2
1987-1996
1997-2015
Political Variables
Public-Sector Union Density
0.13
-1.81***
(0.7)
(0.54)
Private-Sector Union Density
7.83***
0.83
(1.88)
(1.66)
Democratic State Governor
6.61
9.99*
(5.18)
(4.02)
Unified Democratic State Gov. Control
12.09*
-6.73
(5.71)
(4.97)
Inc. Share earned by Top 1%
-2.54
1.21
(2.21)
(1.13)
Economic Variables
GSP per capita
0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
Unemployment Rate
-7.46***
1.04
(1.75)
(2.06)
Poverty Rate
-0.2
-1.41
(1.28)
(1.25)
Median Household Income
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
Racial Variable
Nonwhite
-13.17***
-1.46*
(3.41)
(0.74)
Constant
863.84***
657.22***
(83.74)
(57.21)
Observations
500
950
R-squared
0.69
0.57
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Consistent with class-based theories for welfare expansion, results from the prePRWORA period support these political explanations for determining maximum monthly
benefits for families with children. Both unions and the Democratic party have
historically been advocates for working-class interests, including in the expansion of the
welfare state. This is consistent with power resource theory and the subsequent literature
that has built on this class-based theoretical approach (Brady 2009; Esping-Andersen
1990; Korpi 1983). For programs designated for families with children, unions and
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Democratic parties are associated here with higher AFDC maximum monthly benefit
levels for 3-person families.
For economic variables, unemployment is negatively correlated with AFDC
benefits. As the unemployment rate increases by 1% within a state, AFDC maximum
benefits decrease by $7.46 over a three-year period (p < 0.001). This is an indication of
the inherent contradiction of the goals of the AFDC program and how the design of
AFDC counters broader theoretical logics which would expect to see benefits increase as
unemployment increases. Its stated goal was to promote the traditional family structure
by keeping white women out of labor force and having them dependent on men for
economic stability. However, this program also had work requirements that were
implemented which pushed women with children into the labor force in order to secure
their eligibility for these benefits. As unemployment increases, benefits for this program
for families would decrease over the three-year period.
Aligned with racial explanations of the welfare state, the percent of a state’s
population that is nonwhite is correlated with AFDC benefits. A 1% increase in the
population of a state that is nonwhite is associated with a decrease in AFDC maximum
benefits of $13.17 (p < 0.001) over a three-year period. What this indicates is that racial
discrimination and oppression influenced the amount states allocated to welfare programs
for families with children prior to welfare reform being implemented (Reese 2005; Soule
and Zylan 1997). These results reinforce the argument that welfare programs were
designed in a manner to reduce benefits to nonwhite populations due to the demonization
of nonwhites as abusers of welfare generosity (Soss et al. 2011; Abramovitz 1992).
Examples include the Avenues of Self-Sufficiency Through Employment and Training
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Services (ASSETS) project in Alabama and Work First in North Carolina, both of which
were targeted towards African Americans to get them off of welfare (Reese 2005; Zylan
and Soule 2000). This differs from the most influential determinants of state-level
welfare spending in the later time period.
The second time period, 1997 to 2015, starts in the year after PRWORA was
enacted and further increased states’ responsibility for family welfare programs, reported
in Model 2. During this time period, political actors still remain significant predictors of
benefits for families, although in different ways. Contrary to what was expected,
unionization becomes negatively correlated with maximum benefits for TANF, a major
change from the previous time period. A 1% increase in public-sector unionization within
a state is associated with a decrease of $1.81 in TANF maximum monthly benefits over a
three-year period (p < 0.001). This result runs counter to class-based approaches of
welfare generosity, such as power resource (Brady 2009; Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi
1983). This is additionally interesting considering private-sector unionization is no longer
significant in the post-PRWORA period.
This may be a context-driven result for this particular program that is connected
to the attack on unionized employees who administered TANF benefits to eligible
recipients. After PRWORA was passed, state and local governments argued that
unionized state employees who administered welfare programs were too costly and
inefficient. With states privatizing welfare administration to private agencies, the
argument presented by politicians and capital interests was that this would save the state
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money that could then be reallocated to recipients. This finding in the post PRWORA
period may be the result of this6.
A Democratic governor in a state is associated with an increase in TANF monthly
maximum benefits of $9.99 over a three-year period (p < 0.05). This is a shift however
from the previous period in which unified Democratic control of a state’s government
was positively associated with benefit increases. This may be due to the Democratic party
being focused on regaining support from white, working- and middle-class voters who
were largely pro-welfare reform. Democrats were pushing for welfare reform during this
time period, as were Republicans. This shift between both political party variables from
pre-PRWORA is also an indication of the increased power and importance of the state
Governor position when individual states increasingly become arenas of political
contention. State Governors have the electoral power to pass or veto state-proposed
welfare bills.
While political variables remain significant predictors of generosity levels of
welfare programs for families with children, there are some changes as to how. Changes
to institutional arrangements brought upon under PRWORA have changed how political
actors influence TANF benefit maximums, thus supporting arguments that institutional
structures mediate how political actors influence policy (Amenta and Halfmann 2000;
Amenta et al. 2005). State responses to the increased financial responsibility of funding
TANF has changed how unions in particular influence TANF benefit levels.

6

A jackknife analysis was conducted in order to identify if there were specific cases influencing this result
with the analysis showing no indication of this occurring in the data. The author also conducted additional
robustness checks such as modeling-out and interacting each predictor variable individually with the year
1996 to ensure both periods were comparable.
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Economic variables were not significant predictors of TANF benefits during this
time period, as expected. This is not to say that economic explanations are to be
completely disregarded after the passing of PRWORA. It is that state-level political
actors become more significant at the state level once devolution occurs and the
responsibility of funding welfare programs increases for states.
Racial explanations for TANF spending remained significant, although
marginally, during the post PRWORA period. An increase in the nonwhite population
within a state that by 1% is associated with a decrease in TANF maximum monthly
benefits of $1.46 (p < 0.05) over a three-year period. The rhetoric used by politicians that
people of color on welfare, particularly mothers, were abusers of the welfare state
persisted in the post PRWORA period. Stricter eligibility and work requirements,
alongside promises of retrenchment, were how politicians sought to win the white vote in
the latter half of the 1990s. While aiding the poor garnered support from working-class
and middle-class white voters alike, programs that were labeled “welfare” gained strong
opposition. Both AFDC and TANF were regarded as welfare, since it is needs-based and
not on earnings or rights. It was thus expected that racial theories of the welfare state
would hold true in this period as well.
The results here are indicative of a shift in the set of explanations that are
predictors of welfare benefits for families with children after a change in the institutional
governance structure of welfare policymaking brought on by PRWORA. As state and
local governments increasingly became the political arenas for determining benefits of
public assistance programs, the influence of political actors changed from the previous
period. Pre PRWORA, we see unions and left-leaning politicians advocating for the
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interests of lower-class women by pushing for higher benefit maximums under AFDC.
The results in Model 1 thus support class-based political approaches, such as power
resource theory.
The results from Model 2 tell a different story for how political explanations of
welfare expansion should be understood from the pre PRWORA era. By analyzing public
and private-sector unionization separately, we are able to see a change in how
unionization impacts monthly benefits for the (now) TANF program. Public-sector
unionization is negatively correlated with TANF benefits. This is not to say that publicsector unions were promoting reductions in the amount of assistance families with
children received. In fact, public-sector unions were doing the opposite and opposing the
threat that privatization and retrenchment efforts would bring forth (Winston 2002; Reese
et al. 2006; Reese 2011; Simmons 2002). Instead, this may be the response of state and
local governments to reduce the increased financial responsibilities brought upon by
changes in the federalist structure under PRWORA. State and local governments used the
discourse that public-sector unionized workers who administered AFDC/TANF benefits
were costly and inefficient, thus promoting a privatization campaign across the country.
Decreases in TANF benefits may be the response of state and local governments to
increases in public-sector unionization as they continue to push for privatization and
retrenchment of public assistance generosity.
These models suggest that the institutional changes to the policymaking structure
of welfare for families had an effect on the significance of welfare determinants. The
expansion of a federalist governance structure by PRWORA contributed to this. Running
the entire time period as a single analysis may provide support for certain theories of
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welfare policymaking but overlook the temporal significance of federalist-inspired
policies, such as PRWORA. Results from analyses that use a year dummy for 1996 may
demonstrate that the year was significant for policymaking but doesn’t explain how.
Splitting the analyses into two time periods and running them separately has allowed us
to compare how determinants have changed for needs-based welfare programs as
policymaking structures in the U.S. change. A consequence of federalist changes in
policymaking has been how political determinants influence TANF benefits and when
this occurred would be missed through other methodological approaches7.

7

Corollary analyses were conducted to test interactions but issues of multicollinearity, non-significance,
or not contributing theoretically to the argument make these not worth mentioning. Available upon
request.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This research finds that federalist policies influence the social factors – politics,
economics, and race – impacts the generosity of AFDC/TANF benefits. Therefore, it is
theoretically and methodologically useful to examine time periods prior to and after
large-scale political restructurings. In this case, the 1996 welfare reform that
implemented PRWORA was an important point between two distinct eras of welfare
policymaking. Meant to weaken the role of the federal government and create a smaller
welfare state, individual states were given greater control and responsibility for creating
welfare policies for families and funding them. This created variation over time in how
states handled welfare policymaking, leading to privatization and retrenchment efforts.
The methodological approach taken here captures how the influence of
determinants change with the enactment of PRWORA. There is strong support for the
argument that it is political actors who have the most influence over welfare
policymaking. However, there is a difference in how political actors influence the
determination of benefits for families between both periods. Power resource theory is
supported pre PRWORA, as Leftist political actors, such as left-leaning political parties
(in the case of the U.S., the Democratic party) and labor unions, are positively correlated
with AFDC benefits within states over time. Advocates for the interests of the working
and lower-class may be utilizing their political power resources within political arenas to
push for more egalitarian policies. Alternatively, while Democratic partisanship remained
positively correlated in the post PRWORA period, public-sector unionization changed to
being negatively correlated. I argue that this is due to state and local government’s effort
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to privatize TANF administration in order to offset the increased financial burden.
Governments shift the burden of “high cost” to recipients by reducing the maximum
benefits their able to receive on a monthly basis.
As the federalist political structure of the U.S. has created a dual citizenship
system, examining how the restructuring of welfare policymaking influences welfare
determinants becomes increasingly important. The allocation of responsibility of welfare
programs for families with children has placed women and children within a lower-tier of
citizenship then men. PRWORA has only advanced this further by allowing states to
experiment with eligibility, requirements, benefit levels, administration, and more.
Splitting up analyses by pre and post PRWORA allows us to examine how different
welfare determinants influence benefit levels and, thus, how they influence the social
citizenship of women and children. Which party is in control of state government,
unionization, racial demographics, and unemployment levels influenced the legitimacy of
citizenship for women and children through benefit levels pre PRWORA. Post
PRWORA, it was the political party of the state Governor, unionization (although in a
different manner), and racial demographics that predominantly influenced the
determination of maximum benefit levels. Understanding this gives us further indication
of how continued restructuring of the federalist welfare state in the U.S. influences
citizenship.
This study does contain some limitations. A limitation of this study is that this
paper only examined the impact of PRWORA on maximum monthly benefits allocated to
families with children through AFDC and TANF. However, families rarely, if ever,
actually received the maximum monthly benefit allowed. Families often received benefits
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far below the maximum allowed. Therefore, one should not interpret these results as
being indicative of how much each family on AFDC or TANF actually received. Another
limitation of this study is the years included in this study, particularly for the pre
PRWORA period. The claims made in this paper can only be attributed beginning in
1984 and miss a large portion of U.S. welfare history on AFDC and even its previous
version, Aid to Dependent Children (ADC). By extending the years of data, we may see a
cyclical nature to welfare policymaking, as argued by Piven and Cloward (1971).
Future studies on AFDC/TANF should focus on how much state and local
governments spend on these programs. By focusing on how much, aggregately,
subnational governments spent on these programs, we can get a better understanding of
how PRWORA’s restructuring of financial responsibility affected how much these
governments allocated to AFDC/TANF spending. Future studies of state welfare should
also examine different historical moments of federalist advancement to examine how this
process has played out over welfare history. A similar study could examine pre- and postACA (Affordable Care Act) to see how spending or benefit levels for medical insurance
changed within states. Splitting analysis into distinct time periods may offer scholars a
more comprehensive look into how federalist restructuring of the welfare state changes
welfare determinants for other programs.
This study implemented an alternative methodological approach to investigating
how institutional restructuring of welfare policymaking impacts determinants of policy
benefits. Analyzing time periods separately, based on the passing of a welfare reform act,
provides a way to compare how determinants of welfare benefits change pre- and postreform. In the case of AFDC and TANF, we are able to see that while political actors
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remained significant before and after PRWORA, how they influenced benefit levels
changed after the reform. Economic contexts no longer remain significant benefits after
reform and racial discrimination is a significant determinant in both periods. For welfare
state studies, this approach can provide new insights on the temporal applicability of
theoretical explanations and, thus, how social citizenship is constructed.
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